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provided by family members or for the labor expense of meals eaten 
out. Neither question was really at issue before Judge Rigtrup 
because those items had in fact been paid by Phoenix, up to the 
twenty dollar per day statutory limit. Phoenix also indicated the 
numerous disputed issues of material fact surrounding the payment 
of the specific items sought by plaintiff in this case. Since the 
court below found that the statute did not require payments in 
excess of twenty dollars per day, it did not even reach any issues 
concerning these questions, and accordingly they are moot and 
should not be addressed on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case turns on the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii) (1986), which reads as follows: 
Personal injury protection coverages and benefits 
include: 
(b)(ii) a special damage allowance not 
exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days, 
for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for 
the injury, the injured person would have 
performed for his household, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days 
after the date of injury unless the person's 
inability to perform these services continues for 
more than two consecutive weeks . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts set out by plaintiff were admitted by Phoenix 
for purposes of the summary judgment motion below. R. 41. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute's literal terms provide for a daily limit on 
the amount of special damage allowance which is payable. 
Plaintiff's interpretation would require the Court to gloss over 
the plain meaning of the statute and impose a convoluted reading 
which violates the rules of statutory construction. 
Plaintiff's interpretation would also not serve the 
legislative intent to reduce costs, effectuate savings and provide 
prompt payments. It would instead open up insurance carriers to 
an indefinite amount of liability and encourage them to scrutinize 
claims which are currently paid up to the statutory limit, without 
dispute. 
The one case plaintiff presents in support of her 
position involves a New Jersey statute which, unlike Utah, does 
not provide for payment for gratuitous services. The Utah statute 
reflects a balancing of the wish to pay for gratuitous services 
rendered while avoiding unnecessary administrative expense and 
limiting the insurance carrier's exposure to excessive or 
fraudulent claims. The daily statutory limitation permits a 
reasonable amount of gratuitous services to be compensated for 
while permitting the carrier (and therefore the public who pays 
the premiums) to avoid excessive costs from exorbitant claims or 
the investigation of such claims. The $20 daily limit is the 
legislative answer to these competing interests. This Court 
should respect that determination by giving effect to the statute 
as written and affirm the District Court's order. 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff requests this Court to endorse a strained 
interpretation of Utah's No-Fault Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii) (1986) which would grant her a few 
additional dollars, impose a large administrative and financial 
burden on insurance companies paying benefits under the Act, and 
frustrate the Legislature's intentions to reduce costs, effectuate 
savings, and promote prompt payment on claims. 
Utah's No-Fault Act provides personal injury protection 
to covered individuals ("PIP benefits"). Those PIP benefits 
include medical expenses, up to $3,000 per person; lost wage 
benefits up to $250 per week for up to 52 weeks; and a special 
damage allowance "not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 
days, for services actually rendered or expenses actually incurred 
for services ..." It is this last element, the special damages 
allowance, which concerns us in this case. Plaintiff claims that 
the quoted language should be read to provide an aggregate total 
to permit her to receive $20 for each day of incapacity, up to the 
total amount claimed for services which Plaintiff would have 
performed for her household but for her injury, regardless of when 
the services were rendered or expenses incurred, rather than 
receiving the allowance for services actually rendered or expenses 
actually incurred up to a daily limit of $20.00. 
It should be noted that the other issues mentioned by 
plaintiff, whether the allowance may be recovered for services 
provided by family members or for the labor portion of the expense 
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for meals eaten at a restaurant, are moot and not properly on 
appeal. It is undisputed that Phoenix has paid for such benefits 
to the extent they have been claimed, up to the statutory limit of 
$20 per day. Accordingly, these questions are not in dispute, 
were not considered by the trial judge in granting Phoenix's 
motion for summary judgment, and should not be considered on 
appeal. It is also clear that payment of any additional amounts 
would be subject to the limitation of reasonableness imposed by 
the statute, and would require the determination of disputed 
material facts to resolve. 
THE STATUTE IS CLEAR AND REQUIRES A DAILY LIMIT ON AMOUNTS PAYABLE. 
The issue before the Court is whether the No-Fault Act 
mandates payments in excess of the services actually rendered or 
expenses actually incurred on a given day. The statute requires 
an allowance "not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days 
• . ." While there is no Utah authority directly on point, the 
plain language of the statute, the legislative proposal it serves, 
and Utah case law interpreting its predecessor, all compel the 
conclusion drawn by the court below—that no such additional 
payments are required. 
A. The Rules of Statutory Construction Require That 
Meaning Be Given To All Terms of the Statute. 
To argue that the Utah statute establishes only an 
aggregate upper limit rather than a daily allowance for amounts 
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incurred that day, up to twenty dollars, offends the plain meaning 
of the section. Plaintiffs interpretation strips the term "not 
exceeding $20 per day" of all meaning, other than as a measuring 
stick of the amount recoverable, i.e., $20 x the number of days of 
disability. As this Court recently stated: 
The basic rule for statutory construction is 
that words used in statutes should be given their 
ordinary, plain meaning: 'the presumption is that 
the words are used in their ordinary sense, and 
if a different interpretation is sought it must 
rest upon something in the character of the 
legislation or in the context which will justify 
a different meaning. 
In the Matter of Adoption of M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179 at 1180 (Utah 
App. 1987), quoting Deseret Savings Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 
217 P. 1114, 1115 (1923). The Court should also give effect to 
the Legislature's underlying intent, assume that each term in a 
statute was used advisedly, and interpret the statute in 
accordance with its literal wording unless it is unreasonably 
confusing or inoperable. Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 1988). 
Here the statutory language provides for: 
. . . a special damage allowance not exceeding 
$20 per day for a maximum of 365 days, for 
services actually rendered or expenses reasonably 
incurred for services that, but for the injury, 
the injured person would have performed for his 
household . . . 
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii). The literal reading of this section is 
that a $20 per day limit is placed on services actually rendered 
or reasonably incurred that day. By contrast, plaintiff wishes 
the Court to ignore the statutory language and instead act as if 
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it read "a special damage allowance not to exceed a total of $20 
dollars times the number of days of disability, up to 365 days." 
If that had been intended, it would have been drafted that way by 
the Legislature. 
The literal reading of the statute is in harmony with the 
legislative intent shown when the No-Fault Act was originally 
enacted to "stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in the 
rising costs of automobile accident insurance," Jamison v. Utah 
Home Fire Insurance Company, 559 P.2d 958, 960 (Utah, 1977) 
(emphasis by the Court), citing Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-2. To 
permit recovery beyond that provided by the strict wording of the 
statute would contravene the legislative intent. The statute is 
to be construed to promote justice, and to carry out the purpose 
of the Insurance Code that "policyholders, claimants, and insurers 
are treated fairly and equitably; . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-1-102(2) (1985). As discussed below, the Utah statute 
balances the wish to pay claims for certain "primary damages as to 
necessary medical, hospital, and loss of wages . . . without undue 
delay." Jamison, supra, 559 P.2d at 959, with the "stated 
objective" to effectuate savings. Id at 960. Plaintiffs 
interpretation fails to give the words of the statute their full 
meaning, and would also throw off this legislatively crafted 
balance. 
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B. Utah Case Law Rejects Interpretations Which Gloss 
Over The Statutory Language. 
In Jamison, supra, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
§ 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii), the predecessor to § 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii). 
That section provided in pertinent part: 
• . . in lieu of reimbursement for expenses which 
would have been reasonably incurred for services 
. . . regardless of whether any of these expenses 
were actually incurred, an allowance of $12.00 
per day . . . continuing for a maximum of 365 
days thereafter . . . 
The plaintiff in Jamison sought an "automatic award of $12 per day 
for injury to any member of a household who would have performed 
services of any nature, however much or minimal, and whether their 
value is great or small." 559 P.2d at 959. The Court rejected 
such an approach, applying instead a "rule of reason" in 
determining what amounts could be recovered in any given case, 
stating: 
The principle which best serves the 
objective to be desired is to give both parties 
the benefit of a sensible, even-handed and 
practical application of the statute, under the 
assumption that all of its language was used 
advisedly and in harmony with its purposes. If 
the Act had intended reimbursement for any and 
all duties performed by members of households, it 
could have plainly so stated. But it does not do 
so. Only by keeping the awards within reason, 
and excepting therefrom claims that might be 
unrealistic, fanciful, or perhaps even 
fraudulent, can the stated objective, 'to 
effectuate . . . savings in the rising costs of 
automobile accident insurance . . .'be 
accomplished. Otherwise it is obvious that 
necessary increases in premiums would defeat, 
rather than promote, the purposes of the Act. 
559 P.2d at 960 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). 
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Similarly, if the Legislature intended to only provide a 
cap on recovery rather than a daily limit, it could have easily 
done so. Just as the attempt was rejected in Jamison to recover 
the allowance without regard to the statutory requirement that the 
expenses "would have been reasonably incurred," so should 
plaintiff's attempt here be rejected to recover without regard to 
the statutory limitation of $20 per day. 
Section 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii) differs from § 31-41-
6(l)(b)(ii) by raising the daily limit to $20 and attempting to 
spell out the Jamison court's holding that recovery could be 
either expenses reasonably incurred or services actually 
rendered. That amendment and renumbering, however, does nothing 
to undermine the force of the Jamison court's determination that 
automatic payments are not permitted. Plaintiff here seeks to 
recover payments automatically, without regard to the daily 
limitation provided in that statute. 
C. Plaintiff's Interpretation Raises Problems Of 
Interpretation and Administration. 
Plaintiff's aggregate limit interpretation either permits 
plaintiff to recover up to 20 x 365, without regard to the length 
of disability, an interpretation clearly at odds with the intent 
to effectuate savings the Supreme Court relied so heavily upon in 
Jamison; or to obtain up to $20 x the number of days of 
disability. This latter version raises serious problems of 
implementation and interpretation. To eliminate the statutory 
-9-
daily limit would cast carriers adrift with no practicable way to 
determine how much to pay. Presumably, plaintiff's argument is 
that Phoenix should pay more than twenty dollars on some days on 
the hope that it will be able to offset that overpayment against 
other days when reimbursement for less than $20 is claimed. 
However, this non-textual interpretation provides no guidance in 
determining how far off of a twenty dollar per day average the 
carrier should get in making payments. 
Plaintiffs situation demonstrates a few of the problems 
with her approach. Referring to her household services worksheet, 
Exhibit A to plaintiffs Brief, R. 23-25, plaintiff was injured on 
June 16, 1988. In the next fourteen days, June 17-June 30, 
plaintiff claims reimbursement for $640.50, when even recovering 
$20 for every day would only yield $280 (and plaintiff was paid 
$270). How much of the excess money should Phoenix have 
advanced? Reviewing amounts claimed for the next month shows that 
there was little opportunity to set off any additional amounts 
paid. During July, plaintiff claimed $800.50, while recovery of 
$20 each day would only yield $620. How many days, weeks, or 
months would a carrier have to overpay before it could begin to 
pay less than $20 on a day when $20 or more was claimed in order 
to avoid overpaying? The problem becomes impossible when one 
considers that the duration of a claimant's disability is variable 
and impossible to ascertain in advance. A carrier could advance 
payments and then never have a chance to offset if the claimant 
recovers sooner than expected. If the carrier were to delay 
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payment until the end of disability to avoid this problem, it 
would frustrate the Act's clear intention to provide payment 
"without undue delay." Jamison, 559 P.2d at 959. Following the 
language of the statute and limiting payment to expenses incurred 
or services rendered in a given day, up to $20, avoids these 
problems and permits a fast, definitive determination of the 
claimant's entitlement, effectuating the statutory purpose of 
treating the claimants and insurers fairly and equitably. 
The statutory daily limit serves also another purpose—it 
avoids many disputes regarding the reasonableness of claimed 
expenses or services. As the Jamison decision makes clear, the 
determination of the compensability of each claim is an issue of 
fact turning upon the circumstances of the claim. Where a carrier 
can, as Phoenix did here, attempt to avoid the expense and delay 
of disputing certain items by paying the daily maximum of $20, the 
statute's purpose of treating the parties fairly and avoiding 
delay is served. Under plaintiff's interpretation, however, the 
carrier must scrutinize every claim to avoid having to pay it 
through some as yet undeveloped procedure to offset against 
hoped-for future underpayments. 
Reference to plaintiff's circumstances illustrates this 
point. It is clear under Jamison that payment is only required 
for work actually done, which the plaintiff would have done but 
for the injury, and for which it is reasonable to incur expenses, 
regardless of whether or not expenses were actually incurred. 559 
P.2d at 960-961. In the period June 26 through June 30, plaintiff 
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claims that 59.1 hours of services were rendered, as well as 
additional restaurant expense, for a total of $301,50. Rather 
than having to investigate each item exhaustively to avoid payment 
on inflated claims, Phoenix was able to avoid unnecessary costs 
and delay by permitting recovery of $20 each day. 
D. Plaintiff's Only Case In Support Of Her Position Is 
Not On Point. 
Plaintiff bases her argument on one case from New Jersey, 
Gulla v. Allstate Insurance Co., 180 N.J. Super 413, 434 A.2d 1158 
(N.J. 1981), which has not since been cited in other decisions. 
Plaintiff argues that the Utah statute should be interpreted to 
provide an "aggregate limit," which would permit her to recover 
$20.00 per day even for days in which no service was rendered or 
expense was incurred. 
In Gulla, the statute provided for recovery of "necessary 
and reasonable expenses incurred for such substitute essential 
services" subject to a limit of $12 per day and $4380 over the 
course of the injured person's life. N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-4(c). By 
contrast, Utah's statute permits recovery for both expenses 
actually incurred and other services actually rendered, "not 
exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307(l)(b)(ii). Under the New Jersey approach, necessary 
and reasonable expenses may be reimbursed to permit: 
. . . a recovery of either $12 a day for each day 
of the disability, whether or not payment for 
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services was made on a daily basis, or $4380.00, 
whichever is less, 
434 A.2d at 1160 (emphasis in original). 
There is an important difference between the New Jersey 
statute interpreted in Gulla and Utah's statute. The New Jersey 
statute only refers to reimbursement of expenses incurred, with no 
provision for payment for services gratuitously provided, as 
Utah's statute permits. That broader remedial purpose in Utah's 
statute requires strict adherence to the statutory language. 
Unlike expenses, which are relatively easy to verify, the extent 
of services rendered for which no payment was made is inherently 
difficult to substantiate. The Utah Legislature chose to require 
payment for gratuitous services rendered, but it also imposed an 
upper limit on the amount allowed each day. To eliminate the 
protection afforded by the statutory daily limit would upset the 
balance established by the Legislature, and encourage carriers to 
spend additional time and money investigating special damage 
allowance claims to avoid incurring unnecessary expense, which 
would effectively delay the payment of and increase the cost of 
PIP benefits for everyone. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
. . . insurance is a business, not a 
philanthropy. There can be no free gifts or 
benefactions. In the long run premiums must pay 
for losses; and therefore, increases in premiums 
must and will be correlated to the extent of the 
coverage. . . . Accordingly, a seeming generosity 
in broadening coverage in an individual 
situation, would be no favor to policyholders 
generally, nor to the public. 
Jamison, supra, 559 P.2d at 960. 
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Plaintiff's interpretation is cumbersome, leads to 
uncertainty, delay, and increased expense and cost. By contrast, 
the decision of the court below gives meaning to all of the 
statute, effectuates the stated purposes of the No-Fault Act, and 
provides a simple, fast, and definite method to pay the PIP 
special damages allowance. Utah courts have not adopted the 
"aggregate limit" view in conjunction with Title 31A, and have 
rejected automatic payments under its predecessor statute. There 
is no Utah authority to permit payments in excess of the amounts 
actually incurred in a given day and they should not be 
permitted. The District Court's rejection of plaintiff's attempt 
to reach beyond the statutory language was correct and should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
In interpreting the No-Fault Act, the Court must give 
effect to the plain language of the statute, and seek to act 
consistently with the stated legislative intent. A "liberal" 
interpretation of the statute does not always compel broader 
coverage, especially where, as here, such an interpretation would 
increase costs contrary to the original legislative intent, and 
lead to delays, uncertainty, and confusion. Plaintiff's 
interpretation provides no method to cut off the carrier's 
liability short of the 365 day limit, would engender unnecessary 
disputes between claimants and insurers, and would upset the 
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legislative plan which provides for limited payment of 
gratuitously rendered services. The District Court's ruling 
avoids these problems, permits the payment of the definite sums 
provided for by the statute, and should be affirmed. 
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A D D E N D U M 
New Jersey Sta tu tes Annotated 
3 9 : 6 A - 3 MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC 
Historical Note 
The amendment by L.1972, c. 203, before they cancel any required cov-
deleted a requirement in the last erage. 
paragraph that the consent of the
 E f f e c t i v e d a t e o f L . 1 9 7 2 , c. 70, see 
commissioner of insurance be ob-
 H i s t o r i c a l N o t e u n d e r § gg-g^j . 
tamed by licensed insurance carriers 
Cross References 
Compulsory motor vehicle insurance, see §§ 39:6B-1, 39:6B-2. 
Library References 
Automobiles <§=>43. C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 110. 
3 9 : 6 A - 4 . Personal injury protection coverage, regardless of 
fault 
Every automobile liability insurance policy insuring an auto-
mobile as defined in this act against loss resulting from liability 
imposed by law for bodily injury, death and property damage 
sustained by any person arising out of ownership, operation, 
maintenance or use of an automobile shall provide additional 
coverage, as defined herein below, under provisions approved by 
the Commissioner of Insurance, for the payment of benefits 
without regard to negligence, liability or fault of any kind, to 
the named insured and members of his family residing in his 
household who sustained bodily injury as a result of an accident 
involving an automobile, to other persons sustaining bodily inju-
ry while occupying the automobile of the named insured or while 
using such automobile with the permission of the named insured 
and to pedestrians, sustaining bodily injury caused by the named 
insured's automobile or struck by an object propelled by or from 
such automobile. "Additional coverage" means and includes: 
a. Medical expense benefits. Payment of all reasonable med-
ical expenses incurred as a result of personal injury sustained in 
an automobile accident. In the event of death, payment shall be 
made to the estate of the decedent. 
b. Income continuation benefits. The payment of the loss of 
income of an income producer as a result of bodily injury dis-
ability, subject to a maximum weekly payment of $100.00, per 
week. Such sums shall be payable during the life of the injured 
person and shall be subject to an amount or limit of $5,200.00, 
on account of injury to any one person, in any one accident. 
204 
NO FAULT INSURANCE 39:6A~4 
c. Essential services benefits. Payment of essential services 
benefits to an injured person shall be made in reimbursement of 
necessary and reasonable expenses incurred for such substitute 
essential services ordinarily performed by the injured person for 
himself, his family and members of the family residing in the 
household, subject to an amount or limit of $12.00 per day. 
Such benefits shall be payable during the life of the injured per-
son and shall be subject to an amount or limit of $4,380.00, on 
account of injury to any one person in any one accident. 
d. Survivor benefits. In the event of the death of an income 
producer as a result of injuries sustained in an accident entitling 
such person to benefits under section 4 of this act,1 the maxi-
mum amount of benefits which could have been paid to the in-
come producer, but for his death, under section 4 b. shall be paid 
to the surviving spouse, or in the event there is no surviving 
spouse, then to the surviving children, and in the event there are 
no surviving spouse or surviving children, then to the estate of 
the income producer. 
In the event of the death of one performing essential services 
as a result of injuries sustained in an accident entitling such 
person to benefits under section 4 c. of this act, the maximum 
amount of benefits which could have been paid such person, un-
der section 4 c , shall be paid to the person incurring the expense 
of providing such essential services. 
e. Funeral expenses benefits. All reasonable funeral, burial 
and cremation expenses, subject to a maximum benefit of 
$1,000.00, on account of the death to any one person in any one 
accident shall be payable to decedent's estate. 
L.1972, c. 70, § 4. Amended by L.1972, c. 203, § 3, eff Dec 26, 1972 
i This section 
Historical Note 
As originally added by L1972, c 
70, the definition of " s u n n o r bene-
fits" read as follow s 
"d Survivor benefits In the 
event of the death of an income pro 
ducer or one performing essential 
services as a result of injuries sus 
tamed in an automobile accident, the 
benefits that would ha\e l>een paid 
to the injured person but for his 
death under section 4a, b, and c, 
shall be paid to the surviving spouse 
dependent upon the deceased for such 
income or essential serwees, or in 
the event there is no dependent sur-
viving spouse, then to the surviving 
children dependent upon the deceased 
for such income or essential serv-
ices " 
The amendment b\ L1972, c 203, 
allowed foi payment of benefits to 
persons injuied as a result "of an ac-
cident involving an automobile" rath-
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elude: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Law Reviews. 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Ken- No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, —State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New j j . Rev. 248. 
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico Compensation Systems and Utah's No-
and South Carolina. Faul t S ta tu te , 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383. 
Croqq Reference Countrywide Overview of Automobile 
oross-Keterence. No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J . 443 
Safety Responsibility Act, 14-12-1 ct (1974). 
seq. 
31-41-2. Purpose of act—Property damage claims not affected.—The 
purpose of this act is to require the payment of certain prescribed benefits 
in respect to motor vehicle accidents through either insurance or other 
approved security but on the basis of no fault, preserving, however, the 
right of an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the 
most serious types of injuries occur. The intention of the legislature is 
hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising 
costs of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, 
equitable method of handling the greater bulk of the ersonal injury 
claims that arise out of automobile accidents, these being those not involv-
ing great amounts of damages. This act is not designed to have any effect 
on property damage claims. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 2. See Am. Jur . 2d, No-Faul t Insurance 
SS 1-34, when published. 
Collateral References. 
Insurance<§^>4.1. Validity and construction of "no-fault" 
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. R. 3d 
229. 
31-41-3. Definition of terms.—As used in this act : 
0 ) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle of a kind required to be 
registered under Title 41. but excluding, however motorcycles. 
(2) "Person" includes every natural person, firm, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation, or any governmental entity, or agency of it. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who holds the legal title to a motor 
vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agree-
ment or lease with option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the 
right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for 
purposes of this act. 
(4) "Insured" means the named insured, the spouse or other relative 
of the named insured who reside in the same household as the named in-
sured, including those who usually make their home in the same household 
but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using the described motor 
vehicle with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner. 
(5) "Occupying" means being in or upon a motor vehicle as a pas-
senger or operator or engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding, 
or alighting from a motor vehicle. 
(6) "Pedestrian" means any natural person not occupying or riding 
upon a motor vehicle. 
(7) "Department" means the Utah insurance department. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 3. 
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31-41-6. Minimum benefits — Determination of reasonable value of 
medical expenses—Medical expenses include nonmedical remedial care and 
treatment in accordance with religious method—Deductible amounts al-
lowed.—(1) Every insurance policy or other security complying with the 
requirements of subsection (1) of section 31-41-5 shall provide personal 
injury protection providing for payments to the insured and to all other 
persons suffering personal injury arising out of an accident involving any 
motor vehicle, except as otherwise provided in this act, in at least the 
following minimum amounts: 
(a) Medical benefits: the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary 
medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, and rehabilitation services, including 
prosthetic devices, necessary ambulance, hospital, and nursing services 
not to exceed a total of $2,000 per person, as determined under subsection 
(2) of this section. 
(b) Disability benefits- (i) 85% of any loss of gross income and loss 
of earning capacity per person from inability to work during a period 
commencing not later than three days after the date of the injury and con-
tinuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks thereafter, not to exceed a 
total of $150 per week, but if the person's inability to work shall so con-
tinue for in excess of a total of two consecutive weeks after the date of 
the injury, this three-day elimination period shall not be applicable; and 
(ii) in lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would have been reason-
ably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured person 
would have performed for his household and regardless of whether any 
of these expenses are actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per day 
commencing not later than three days after the date of the injury and 
continuing for a maximum of 365 days thereafter, but if the person's in-
ability to perform these services shall so continue for in excess of a total 
of fourteen days after the date of the injury, this three-day elimination 
period shall not be applicable. 
(c) Funeral benefits: funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to 
exceed a total of $1,000 per person. 
(d) Survivor benefits- compensation on account of death of a person, 
payable to his heirs, in the total of $2,000. 
(2) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses pro-
vided for in subsection (1) of this section and in subsection (1) (e) of 
section 31-41-9, the department shall conduct a relative value study of 
services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabili-
tation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state for 
the purpose of assigning a unit value and median charge to each type of 
service and accommodation. In conducting the study, the department 
shall consult with appropriate public and private medical and health 
agencies. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and 
publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and median 
charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation. The value of 
any service or accommodation shall be determined by applying the unit 
value and median charge assigned to the service or accommodation under 
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the relative value study. If a service or accommodation is not assigned a 
unit value or median charge under the relative value study, the value of 
the service or accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same 
or similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of this 
state. Nothing herein shall preclude the department from adopting a sched-
ule already established if it meets the requirement of this subsection. In 
disputed cases, a court on its own motion or the motion of either party 
may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed 
physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue of the reason-
able value of their medical expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in subsection (1) of this section 
and in subsection (1) (e) of section 31-41-9 shall include expenses for any 
nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a 
recognized religious method of healing. 
(4) At appropriately reduced premium rates insurers may offer de-
ductibles in amounts not exceeding $500 per accident in respect to the 
insurance coverages required by this act applicable, however, only to 
claims of the insured. 
(5) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit an 
insurance policy from providing coverage for any nonmedical remedial 
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of 
healing. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 6. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 298, Automobile Insur-CoUateral References.
 a n c e § g# 
Insurance<$^>ll.l. 
31-41-7. Personal injuries covered—Primary coverage—Reduction of 
benefits.—(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 shall be ap-
plicable to : 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when injured in an 
accident in this state involving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents occurring 
in this state sustained by any other natural person while occupying the 
described motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while a pedes-
trian if injured in an accident involving the described motor vehicle. 
(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other 
policy, including those complying with this act, primary coverage shall 
be afforded by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of 
which the accident arose. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section 31-41-6 
shall be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
as a result of an accident covered in this act under any workmen's com-
pensation plan or any similar statutory plan; and 
(b) Any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because of military enlist-
ment, duty or service. 
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31A-1-102, Purposes. 
The purposes of the Insurance Code are to: 
(1) ensure the solidity of insurers doing business in Utah; 
(2) ensure that policyholders, claimants, and insurers are treated 
fairly and equitably; 
(3) ensure that Utah has an adequate and healthy insurance mar-
ket, characterized by competitive conditions, the spirit of innovation, 
and the exercise of initiative; 
(4) provide for an insurance department that is expert in the field of 
insurance and able to enforce the Insurance Code effectively; 
(5) encourage cooperation between the Insurance Department and 
other Utah regulatory bodies, as well as other federal and state govern-
mental entities; 
(6) preserve and improve state regulation of insurance; 
(7) maintain freedom of contract and enterprise; 
(8) encourage self regulation of the insurance industry; 
(9) encourage loss prevention as part of the insurance industry; 
(10) keep the public informed on insurance matters; and 
(11) achieve other purposes stated elsewhere in the Insurance Code. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-M02, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 6. 
Insurance Code. — See § 31A-1-101. 
31 A-l-103. Scope and applicability of title, 
(1) This title does not apply to: 
(a) retainer contracts made by attorneys-at-law with individual cli-
ents with fees based on estimates of the nature and amount of services 
to be provided to the specific client, and similar contracts made with a 
group of clients involved in the same or closely related legal matters; 
(b) arrangements for providing benefits that do not exceed a limited 
amount of consultations, advice on simple legal matters, either alone 
or in combination with referral services, or the promise of fee discounts 
for handling other legal matters; 
(c) limited legal assistance on an informal basis involving neither an 
express contractual obligation nor reasonable expectations, in the con-
text of an employment, membership, educational, or similar relation-
ship; or 
(d) legal assistance by employee organizations to their members in 
matters relating to employment. 
(2) This title restricts otherwise legitimate business activity. What this 
title does not prohibit is permitted unless contrary to other provisions of 
Utah law. 
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by insured while occupying "owned" vehicle establishing compensation for claims not 
not insured by policy, 30 A.L.R.4th 172. paid because of insurer's insolvency, 30 
Validity, construction, and effect of statute A.L.R.4th 1110. 
31A-22-306. Personal injury protection. 
Personal injury protection under Subsection 31A-22-302(2) provides the 
coverages and benefits described under § 31A-22-307 to persons described 
under § 31A-22-308, but is subject to the limitations, exclusions, and condi-
tions set forth in § 31A-22-309. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-306, enacted by ment, effective July 1, 1986, substituted 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204, «31A-22-302(2)" for "31A-22-302(3)" and "in" 
§ 158. for "under." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance fault" or personal injury protection (PIP) cov-
§ 1689. erages in automobile liability policy or poli-
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. cies, 29 A.L.R.4th 12. 
A.L.R. — Combining or "stacking" of "no Key Numbers. — Insurance «=> 11.1. 
31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and 
benefits. 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgi-
cal, X-ray, dental, rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic devices), 
ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of 
$3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income 
and loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a 
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this 
benefit need not be paid for the first three days of disability, unless 
the disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks 
after the date of injury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a 
maximum of 365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the in-
jured person would have performed for his household, except that 
this benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date 
of injury unless the person's inability to perform these services 
continues for more than two consecutive weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of 
$1,500 per person; and 
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(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his 
heirs, in the total of $3,000. 
(2) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided 
for in Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commis-
sioner shall, at least once each odd-numbered year, conduct a relative value 
study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or 
rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state 
to assign a unit value and median charge to each type of service and accom-
modation. In conducting the study, the department shall consult with ap-
propriate public and private medical and health agencies. Upon completion 
of the study, the department shall prepare and publish a relative value 
study which sets forth the unit value and median charge assigned to each 
type of service and accommodation. The value of any service or accommoda-
tion is determined by applying the unit value and median charge assigned 
to the service or accommodation under the relative value study. If a service 
or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or median charge under the 
relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation shall equal 
the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or accommodation in the 
most populous county of this state. This subsection does not preclude the 
department from adopting a schedule already established or a schedule 
prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the requirements of 
this subsection. In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the 
motion of either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not 
more than three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on 
the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsec-
tion 31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care 
and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method 
of healing. 
(4) At appropriately reduced premium rates, insurers may offer deducti-
bles in amounts not exceeding $500 per accident with respect to the insur-
ance coverages required under this section. However, the deductible is ap-
plicable only to claims of the named insured and persons living in his 
household. 
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance 
providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under 
this chapter nor does it require the segregation of those minimum cover-
ages from other coverages in the same policy. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by ment, effective July 1, 1986, inserted "pros-
i t 1985, ch. 242, § 27; L. 1986, ch. 204, thetic devices" in Subsection (l)(a), and made 
§ 159. minor stylistic changes throughout the sec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- tion. 
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78-2-1. Number of justices — Term — Chief justice and 
associate chief justice — Selection and functions, 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed initially to serve until 
the first general election held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme 
Court is ten years and commences on the first Monday in January, next 
following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief justice from among 
the members of the court by a majority vote of all justices. The term of the 
office of chief justice is four years. The chief justice may not serve successive 
terms. The chief justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be removed from the 
office of chief justice by a majority vote of all justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a 
vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until 
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is 
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as 
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme 
Court, the chief justice has additional duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of 
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall 
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent 
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice, where not inconsistent with law, may delegate re-
sponsibilities to the associate chief justice. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, "Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch. Supreme Court is ten years and until his suc-
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4. cessor is appointed and approved in accordance 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsection (6), 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection substituted "determines" for "decides" at the 
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read end of the fourth sentence. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
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(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "for-
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in 
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); re-
designated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) ac-
cordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end 
of Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of Sub-
section (3)(e)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)(a) 
which read "first degree and capital felony con-
victions"; substituted "(f)" for "(i)" at the end of 
Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction, 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April 
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) 
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Sub-
section (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for 
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings 
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); 
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision 
of law" at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted 
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsec-
tions (2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to 
(2)(i); added "except those from the small 
claims department of a circuit court" at the end 
of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsec-
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection 
(2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i). 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except" 
which had read "the final orders and decrees of 
state and local agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of them"; deleted "not-
withstanding any other provision of law" at the 
end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted present Sub-
section (2)(b); designated former Subsections 
(2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and 
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for 
"first or capital degree felony" in present Sub-
section (2)(f). 
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